
How interdependent are infrastructures?



VOLUME 279 NUMBER 73

Suggested retail price \$1.00 \$1.50 outside of Metro Boston

The Boston Globe

A NEW WEAK

Today: Partly sunny and colder. H: 37-42. Low 27-32.

Tomorrow: Mostly sunny, milde High 42-47. Low 32-37.

HIGH TIDE: 6:42 a.m., 7:25 p.m. SUNRISE: 6:59 SUNSET: 6:49

FULL REPORT: PAGE B13

MONDAY, MARCH 14, 2011

Cascading disaster in Japan



Blast shakes a second reactor death toll soar

By Martin Fackler and Mark McDonald NEW YORK TIMES

SENDAI, Japan — Japan reel from a rapidly unfolding disaster epic scale yesterday, pummeled by death toll, destruction, and homele ness caused by the earthquake a tsunami and new hazards from da aged nuclear reactors. The prime m ister called it Japan's worst crisis sir World War II.

Japan's \$5 trillion economy, t world's third largest, was threater with severe disruptions and partial ralysis as many industries shut do temporarily. The armed forces and v unteers mobilized for the far more gent crisis of finding survivors, eva ating residents near the strick power plants and caring for the v tims of the record 8.9 magnitu quake that struck on Friday.

The disaster has left more th 10,000 dead, many thousands hor less, and millions without water, poer, heat, or transportation.

From Single Network to Network of Networks

Collaboration:

Amir Bashan, BIU
Sergey Buldyrev, NY
Michael Danziger, BIU
J. Gao: Northeastern
Orr Levy, BIU
Roni Parshani: BIU
Louis Shektman, BIU
Antonio Majdanzic, BU
H. E. Stanley, BU
Dong Zhou, BIU


PARTIAL LIST

Electric grid, Communication Transportation Services

Two types of links:

1. Connectivity

2. Dependency



Shlomo Havlin

multilevel multilayer multiplex

Buldyrev et al, Nature, 464, 1025 (2010)

Parshani et al, PRL ,105, 0484 (2010)

Parshani et al, PNAS, 108, 1007 (2011)

Gao et al, PRL, 107, 195701 (2011)

Gao et al, Nature Phys., 8, 40 (2012)

Wei Li et al, PRL, 108, 228702 (2012)

Bashan et al, Nature Phys. 9, 667 (2013)


Majdanzik et al Nature Comm. 7, 10850 (2016)

Xin Yuan et al, PNAS 114, 3311 (2017)


Cascading failures-abrupt transition

Cyber Attacks-CNN Simulation (2010)


Rosato et al Int. J. of Crit. Infrastruct. 4, 63 (2008)




Railway network, health care systems, financial services, communication systems



SCADA=Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition






CNN SCENARIO


Interdependent Networks

 Until 2010 studies focused on a single network which is isolated AND does not interact or influenced by other systems




- •Isolated systems rarely occur in nature or in technology -- analogous to non-interacting particles (molecules, spins).
- Results for interacting networks are strikingly different from those of single networks.

Percolation of Network-Giant Component P_{∞}



Scale-free network: N=50; λ =2.5 – attacking 7 nodes p=43/50



Comparing single and coupled networks: Robustness


Remove randomly (or targeted) a 1-pfraction nodes

 P_{∞} Size of the largest connected component (cluster)

Breakdown threshold

Single networks:

Continuous transition





Coupled networks:

New paradigm-Abrupt transition

Cascading Failures

Exponential (ER)






$$P(k) = e^{-\langle k \rangle} \frac{\langle k \rangle^k}{k!}$$


Scale-free (SF)

$$P(k) = \begin{cases} ck^{-\lambda} & m \le k \le K \\ 0 & otherwise \end{cases}$$



Message: our world is extremely unsafe!


GENERALIZATION: PARTIAL DEPENDENCE: Theory and Simulations



Designing Robust Coupled Networks: Italy 2003 blackout

Random interdependencies


Nearly optimal interdependencies




Schneider, Araujo, Havlin, Herrmann, Designing Robust Coupled Networks, Scientific Reports (2013)

RESULTS: THEORY and SIMULATIONS: ER Networks

 P_{∞} after τ -cascades of failures




Removing 1-p nodes in A




Catastrophic cascades just below P_c

ABRUPT TRANSITION (1st order)

$$p_c = 2.4554 / \langle k \rangle$$
 For a single network $p_c = 1/\langle k \rangle$ $\langle k \rangle_{\min} = 2.4554$ for single network $\langle k \rangle_{\min} = 1$ $\langle \tau \rangle \sim N^{1/3}$ Dong Zhou et al (2013)




Interdependent Networks




Origin of Plateau

Simultaneous first and second order percolation transitions



RANDOM REMOVAL – PERCOLATION FRAMEWORK



Network of Networks (tree)

For ER, $\langle k_i \rangle = k$, full coupling q=1,


ALL loopless topologies (chain, star, tree):

$$P_{\infty} = p[1 - \exp(-kP_{\infty})]^n$$

n=1 known ER- 2nd order

$$p_c = 1/\langle k \rangle$$

Vulnerability increases significantly with n



Buldyrev et al, Nature, 464, 1025 (2010) Parshani et al, PRL ,105, 0484 (2010) Parshani et al, PNAS, 108, 1007 (2011) Gao et al PRL (2011)


Random Regular Network of ER networks

 $P_{\infty} = p[1 - \exp(-\langle k \rangle P_{\infty})]$


Surprisingly Independent on n!

Network of Networks (loop)

GENERAL FRAMEWORK -- PARTIAL DEPENDENCE



For ER networks:



$$P_{\infty} = p[1 - \exp(-kP_{\infty})(qP_{\infty} - q + 1)]$$


No dependence on m

For q = 1, $P_{\infty} = 0$ -no giant component for any p


For q = 0, the known single network result

Jianxi Gao et al, PRL (2011)


Eradicating abrupt collapse in interdependent networks via reinforced nodes



Eradicating catastrophic collapse in interdependent networks via reinforced nodes




Eradicating catastrophic collapse in interdependent networks via reinforced nodesReal Data--- US Power grid




Few percent of autonomous power stations and communication systems can avoid abrupt collapse

Eradicating catastrophic collapse in interdependent networks via reinforced nodes




$$\rho^* = 1 - \frac{\exp\left\{\frac{1}{2}\left[1 - \langle k \rangle (1 - q)^2 / 2q\right]\right\}}{2 - \sqrt{\langle k \rangle (1 - q)^2 / 2q}}$$

Introducing Recovery-Single Networks





Spontaneous Recovery and Failure 0.4

Majdanzik et al Nature Phys. 10, 3438 (2014)



Introducing Recovery-Single Networks







Diffusion of a SYSTEM in phase space


Spontaneous Recovery and Failure


Majdanzik et al Nature Phys. 10, 3438 (2014)




Simultaneous Recovery and Failure of Interdependent Networks








CDS INDEX DATA FROM EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA Majdanzic et al Nature Comm. 7, 10850 (2016)




Complex Hysteresis-Interdependent Networks




Majdanzic et al Nature Comm. 7, 10850 (2016)

Optimal Repairing Strategies




Interdependent Spatially Embedded Networks




Many networks are spatially embedded: Internet, Power grid, Transportation etc


Bashan et al, Nature Physics (2013)



Theory (based on critical exponent): NO continuous transition for any q>0-extreme vulnerability!!



The extreme vulnerability of spatial embedded coupled networks



0.1


0.2

0.4

0.6

8.0

Spatial embedded compared to random coupled networks when q changes



http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.2062
Nature Physics, (2013)

Bashan et al

Message: our world is extremely unsafe!-no safe zone!

0.2


0.4

q


0.6

8.0

Experimental test on real spatial embedded coupled networks




Interdependent Spatially Embedded Networks



When connectivity links are limited in their length---same universality class as lattices!


Many networks are spatially embedded: Internet, Power grid, Transportation etc




THREE DIFFERENT BEHAVIORS DEPENDING ON 1

Wei et al, PRL, 108, 228702 (2012) Bashan et al, Nature Physics (2013)

Interdependent Spatially Embedded Networks



Many networks are spatially embedded: Internet, Power grid, Transportation etc




Wei et al, PRL, 108, 228702 (2012) Bashan et al, http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.2062

New percolation-localized attacks

Localized attacks on spatially embedded systems with dependencies: critical size attack

Y. Berezin et al, . arXiv:1310.0996




New percolation-localized attacks

Localized attacks on spatially embedded systems with dependencies: critical size attack


Y. Berezin et al, . Scientific Reports (2015)

Europe-power grid




FINITE SIZE FAILURE
CATASTROPHIC COLLAPSE


$$p_c = 1$$





Interdependent Spatially Embedded Networks – Two Models


Connectivity Length (Multiplex)














RANDOM FAILURES-TWO MODELS




RANDOM FAILURES-Localized attacks



New percolation-localized attacks



Cascading of Overload Failures-Localized Attack



Summary and Conclusions

- Statistical physics approach for robustness of Networks and of interdependent networks—cascading failures.
- •New paradigm: abrupt collapse compared to continuous in single network
- Generalization to "Network of Networks": n interdependent networks-60y of graph theory and percolation is only the limited case, n=1!
- Spontaneous failure and recovery of system of systems-optimal repairing
- Localized attacks-finite size failure- zero fraction; $p_c=1$ -- full collapse!!

